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EDITORIAL RESPONSE
The Next Supreme Court Appointment
In our March issue we published an editorial by
the Journal's Editor-in-Chief, in which he advocated that the next appointee to the Supreme
Court of the United States-and, indeed, any
future appointee--should be an "able, experienced
federal or state court judge who, by his judicial
decisions and opinions, has evidenced a viewpoint
of moderation with respect to the issue of individual civil liberties and public safety". Following
is a response to this editorial which we received
from ProfessorH. H. A. Cooper, of the Universidad
Nacional Mayor de Sai Marcos de Lima, whose
professorship is that of "a British technical aid
post":
I read with considerable attention your challenging March editorial. Might an English lawyer, whose own tudies have been principally
in this field, be permitted an observation or
two?
I question the wisdom of filling the next Supreme Court vacancy primarily by reference
to the existing crime problem. Clearly in making the appointment the improvement of
law enforcement and the diminution of the
causes of crime should not be absent from the
President's mind. I do not feel, however, that
this fact ought to weigh so heaVily in his judgement. Crime is far from the exclusive consideration of the Supreme Court Justice, though
naturally it attracts more attention than the
more pedestrian of his activities. Ought the
President to appoint, then, a judge whose experience and whose duties in the future are so
definitely oriented? Would this not have a dangerously narrowing effect, not merely as a precedent for future appointments, but also by reducing the appointee to a second-class status

by comparison with those of this colleagues
designated by reference to more ample criteria?
Secondly, and with considerable deference,
I question whether it is constitutionally correct for the President to appoint by reference
to some supposed notion of pre-existent judicial philosophy. The appointee ought to be chosen, not because he is assumed to represent any
particular standpoint in relation to matters
likely to come before him in a judicial capacity
but rather because he will make a good judge.
This implies, under a common law system, that
he will try as faithfully as possible to reflect in
his dec isions and opinions the social conscience
of the nation as he interprets it, an objective
'rather than'subjective notion. "Hard Line" or
"Liberal" label§ may well serve to distinguish
the Justice as a component part of the
Court-for lie after all remains an'individual and is distinguishable from his colleagues
-but it is unrealistic so to label him before
he has demonstrated his position, which is
merely an index of how he conceives of and'
goes about his interpretative function, and
to 'appoint him with a specific role in mind
would, to my view, be improper and tantamount to packing the Bench, albeit with
worthy motives.
I also venture to question the value of restricting selection to the ranks of the lower
Judiciary. Granted this affords a rational criterion as to aptitude as a judge, but this should
not be overstressed in the particular context
as a close study of the English system of selection will show. Few appointments to the
House of Lords are made direct from the Bar,
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but a notable exception in recent years was
Lord Radcliffe, one of the greatest of appeal
judges. Often an excellent trial judge is disappointing or ill at ease in the rarefied atmosphere of the highest of tribunals, as witness
Lord Devlin. Academics are not appointed in
England, though there are those who argue we
missed much by not having appointed Sir
Frederick Pollock to the Bench, but would you
really want to deny yourself another Frankfurter? The stature of the Court is surely best
enhanced by appointing to it men of calibre
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who are likely, (for one can realistically hope
for no more) to be good judges, moderates in
the sense of holding no particular philosophy,
but rather by reason of their possession of those
qualitites of balance and good sense that guarantee the declaration of sound law.
I am not unmindful of the problems to which
you postulate this as an answer, but I do not
feel the erection of this novel philosophy of
judicial appointments is a solution and in the
long run is, I feel sure, likely to cause more
difficulties than it resolves.

